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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE LANDOWNER'S DUTY TOWARD MINOR
CHILDREN IN ILLINOIS
Many problems accompany the ownership or occupancy of realty, not
the least of which are those encountered by landowners in the discharge
of their duties toward minor children who are upon the land. In general,
landowners are required to exercise different degrees of care toward persons upon their land depending upon whether the person is an invitee,
licensee, or trespasser. Thus, when invitees are upon his land, the landowner is required to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and
to warn invitees of dangerous conditions existing thereon.' Similarly, the
owner or occupant of land has a duty to refrain from wilfully or wantonly
injuring trespassers or licensees on the land (including social guests), 2 and
also has the possible additional duty to warn licensees of hidden dangers.8
In the case of small children, however, the landowner's duties are not
as clear. Generally, no greater duty is imposed on a landowner because
the invitee, licensee, or trespasser is a minor.4 But, this concept has been
qualified in Illinois by the development of the ''Attractive Nuisance"
doctrine which, in effect, makes invitees out of trespassing or licensed
children thereby increasing the landowner's duty toward them.
THE LANDOWNER'S DuTY TowARD MINOR INVITEES PRIOR TO 1955

A person becomes an invitee when the owner of land extends an invitation, express or implied, to that person to enter upon the land for a
purpose having some connection with the owner's business or pecuniary
interests. 5 The test is a conjunctive one, requiring both invitation and
benefit; so that the ordinary social guest is merely a licensee. In the case
of small children, at least, it usually will be difficult to find any direct
business or pecuniary benefit accruing to the landowner by their presence.
In the typical case, however, the minor is injured while accompanying an
adult, whose presence does have a possible pecuniary benefit. In such
cases it is generally found that the accompanying child is an invitee.
Thus, in O'Rourke v. Marshall Field & Company,6 a six-year-old minor
was injured in a fall from a defective rocking horse. The defendant kept
1 Geraghty v. Burr Oak Lanes, Inc., 5 Ill.
2d 153, 125 N.E.2d 47 (1955).
2 Wolezek v. Public Service Co., 342 Ill.
482, 174 N.E. 577 (1931); Kahn v. James
Burton Co., 1 Ill.
App. 2d 370, 117 N.E.2d 670 (lst Dist. 1955), rev'd, 5 Ill, 2d 614, 126
N.E.2d 836.

3 Bartolucci v. Falleti, 382 Ill.
168, 46 N.E.2d 980 (1943).
4 Wagner v. Kepler, 411 Ill.
368, 104 N.E.2d 227 (1952); McDermott v. Burke, 256
Ill.
401, 100 N.E. 168 (1912).
5 Jones v. 20 North Wacker Drive Building Corporation, 332 Ill. App. 382, 75 N.E.2d
400 (Ist Dist. 1947).
8 307 Il1. 197, 138 N.E. 625 (1923).
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the horse in a playroom maintained for the use of children of the defendant's customers. The defendant contended that it owed no duty to
the child and that there was no invitation, express or implied, extended
to the child by the defendant. The court disagreed and held that the child
was an invitee under an implied invitation since the child accompanied an
adult to the store and the playroom was provided for the use and benefit
of the customers' children. The court stated:
• . . This necessarily implies a general invitation to anyone in the
store accompanied by children to make use of the playroom at all
proper times. Plaintiff being there by implied invitation, it was the
duty of the appellant (defendant) to use reasonable 7 care in providing a reasonably safe place for the plaintiff to play.
In Wheaton v. Goldblatt Bros.,s a twelve-year-old girl accompanied her
mother, who was shopping in the defendant's store. The girl was injured
when goods fell on her. The court allowed the girl to recover from the
defendant, holding that a child accompanying a customer in a store is in
the position of an invitee under an implied invitation, and that the defendant, therefore, had a duty to exercise a reasonable degree of care in
her behalf.
In a recent Appellate Court case in the Second District,9 the defendant
owned a building operated as a club for the benefit of its members, their
wives and children. The plaintiff was the 3i-year-old daughter of a member,
and accompanied her parents to the defendant's club. The court found that
she was on the premises in the capacity of an invitee since she was with her
parents who were invitees. Recovery was denied to the plaintiff for injuries
she sustained in falling on a hot radiator, since the defendant had kept the
premises in a reasonably safe condition. The court stated the rule as
follows:
She (plaintiff) was an invitee and defendant owed to the plaintiff
the duty is owed to all invitees and that was to have its premises
in a reasonably safe condition. Due care in any case is the care
usually exercised by men of ordinary prudence in like cases and
under like circumstances. This is the standard by which the conduct of those charged with negligence is measured. 10
These cases serve to illustrate that the duty of care owed by a landowner to a minor invitee prior to 1955 was the same as that owed to adults,
namely to use reasonable care to keep the premises in a safe condition. A
child was considered to be an invitee if he accompanied his parents on the
landowner's premises and the parents were invitees. This classification existed even though in the absence of the parent's presence, the child would
otherwise have been a licensee or trespasser.
7 Id.

at 199, 138 N.E. at 626.

295 Ill. App. 618, 15 N.E.2d 64 (1st Dist. 1938).
9 Dargie v. East End Bolders Club, 346 Il1. App. 480, 105 N.E.2d 537 (2d Dist. 1952).
10 Id. at 492, 105 N.E.2d at 542.
8
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THE LANDOWNER'S DUTY TOWARD MINOR TRESPASSERS AND
LICENSEES PRIOR TO 1955
A person is a trespasser when he enters upon the land or premises of
another without permission or an express or implied invitation." A person
who has permission to enter the premises of another or who is a social guest

is considered a licensee. 12 The duty owed by an occupier or owner of land
to licensees and trespassers is the same for both and is considerably less than
the duty owed to invitees. There is no duty to see that the premises are safe
for their use.' 3 The only duty is to refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring such trespassers or licensees once their presence in a place of danger
has been discovered or should reasonably have been anticipated. 14
That the same rule generally applies to minor licensees or trespassers
is aptly illustrated in Jones v. Schmidt.15 In the Jones case, the plaintiff
was five years old and a neighbor of the defendant. On the day of the injury
it was raining and the plaintiff was ready to leave for school. The defendant
had backed her car out of the garage to her own doorway to pick up her
own child and invited the plaintiff to ride to school. The defendant, however, told the plaintiff not to cross the yard because it was full of puddles,
but to go through the house to be picked up at the front sidewalk. The
defendant then backed up the car, looking to the rear, and hit the plaintiff
who had disregarded the plaintiff's instructions and had come across the
yard. The court found that the plaintiff had lost her status as an invitee
by departing from the place to which the invitation applied, and that the
plaintiff then became a mere trespasser or licensee. Since the plaintiff was
not an invitee, the court held that the defendant did not owe her a duty
of due care. Inasmuch as the complaint did not charge the defendant with
wilful and wanton misconduct, the defendant did not breach her duty to
the plaintiff as a licensee or trespasser. The rule was stated by the court
to be:
The general rule is that no different or higher duty exists with
spect to an infant trespasser than would exist in the case of
adult trespasser, so that ordinarily there is no duty toward
infant trespasser except to refrain from wilful or wanton
jury ....

A similar statement pertains to infant licensees.'

6

rean
an
in-

Although the Jones case clearly states the general rule, the attractive
nuisance doctrine has been applied in Illinois in order to allow recovery
for injuries sustained by minor children who are licensees or trespassers.
This doctrine imposes an additional duty upon a landowner, who places
or maintains on his premises a dangerous object which is attractive to
11

Checkley v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 257 Il.

491, 100 N.E. 942 (1913).

12 Milauskis v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 286 Ill. 547, 122 N.E. 78 (1919).
13 Marcovitz v. Hergenrether, 302 Il1. 162, 134 N.E. 85 (1922).
14 Briney v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 401 Ill. 181, 81 N.E.2d 866 (1948).

15 349 Ill. App. 336, 110 N.E.2d 688 (4th Dist. 1953).
16 Id. at 339, 110 N.E.2d at 690.
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children, to take reasonable precautions to prevent the children from playing with it or to protect them from injury by it, whether they be licensees
7
or trespassers.'
The basic elements of the attractive nuisance doctrine as it existed in
Illinois prior to 1955 were listed by the Appellate Court in Kahn v. James
Burton Company.'8 These elements were: (1) the person against whom the
doctrine is asserted must have had possession or control over both the
premises and the object which caused the injury; (2) the object must have
been dangerous per se and likely to cause injury to anyone coming in contact with it; (3) the object must have been attractive and alluring to children incapable of understanding the danger; (4) the object must have been
exposed and easily accessible; and (5) the person in control or possession
must have foreseen that children would come in contact with the object.
Thus if a trespassing child was injured by an object which met with the
first four elements and the owner or occupant of the premises could have
foreseen that children would come into contact with the object, an implied
invitation for the child to enter the premises was created. He then was
treated as an invitee insofar as the owner's duty toward his safety was concerned.
Two qualifications to the attractive nuisance doctrine existed which
limited its application to a considerable extent. They were: (1) the child
must have been injured by the object which attracted him onto the premises; 19 and (2) the attracting object must have been visible from a public
way or street 20 or from a place where he had a right to be or from a place
21
where children are in the habit of congregating.
In Seymour v. Union Stock Yards Company,22 a minor plaintiff was
injured by a train running on tracks adjacent to a large pile of clay to
which many children were attracted. The neighborhood was heavily populated and the area in which the clay was located was not fenced. Even so
the court denied recovery to the plaintiff, and held that while the clay was
attractive, it was not inherently dangerous. Similar results were reached in
24
Matijevich v. Dolese and Shepard Company23 and McDermott v. Burke.
17 Wolezek v. Public Service Co., 342 Ill. 482, 174 N.E. 577 (1931).
18

1 Ill. App. 2d 370, 117 N.E.2d 670, rev'd, 5 Ill. 2d 614, 126 N.E.2d 836 (1st Dist.

1955).
19 Seymour v. Union Stock Yards Co., 224 Ill. 579, 79 N.E. 950 (1906).
20 Commonwealth Elec. Co. v. Melville, 210 Ill. 70, 70 N.E. 1052 (1904); Wolezek v.
Public Service Co., supra note 17.
21 Dabrowski v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co., 303 Ill. App. 31, 24 N.E.2d 382 (1940); Harrison
v. City of Chicago, 308 Ill. App. 263, 31 N.E.2d 359 (1st Dist. 1941); Rokiki v. Polish
Nat'l Alliance of United States, 314 Ill. App. 380, 41 N.E.2d 300 (lst Dist. 1942).
22 Seymour v. Union Stock Yards Co., supra note 19.
23 261 Ill. App. 498 (1st Dist. 1931). The plaintiff was attracted by a shallow pool
on the defendant's land and was injured by dynamite caps he found one-half mile from
the pool.
24 256 Ill. 401, 100 N.E. 168 (1912). A sand pile attracted a minor child, who was
injured by a hoisting rope on the premises.
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In Favaro v. Jacobucci,25 the Court denied recovery based on the attractive nuisance doctrine since the plaintiff was injured by a machine found
only after he entered the defendant's store. The machine was not visible
from the street. Similarly, recovery has been denied when the attractive instrument injuring the minor plaintiff was found only after a trespass onto
the defendant's land.2 6 Since the reason that recovery has been allowed
when the dangerous object is visible from the street is that the irresistible
attractiveness of the object amounts to an implied invitation to the child to
enter upon the property,27 it is relatively clear why recovery has been denied
in cases in which the object causing the injury did not attract the child onto
the property.
An exception to the rule that the attractive object must be visible from
the street has been made in situations where children habitually come on
the premises with the owner's knowledge. 28 In such cases, the children are
considered to have the consent of or an implied invitation from the owner
and are treated as invitees.
Because the heart of the attractive nuisance doctrine is that the child
must be injured by a dangerous object which lured him onto the defendant's property, it is understandable that a major issue which arises in
numerous cases is whether or not the attracting object is dangerous per se.
In that regard the courts have considered each attracting object on its own
merits in the particular situation of each case, giving rise to determinations
that seem arbitrary in many instances. For example, objects which have
been found not to constitute attractive nuisances include a pile of clay,29
a barrel of hot tar, 0 an ordinary railroad tank car,8 ' a motor vehicle in
ordinary use,32 and an open body of water.3 3 On the other hand, an abandoned car, 34 dismantled truck,8 5 and a body of water with objects floating
on its surface 6 have been held to be attractive nuisances. As a consequence,
if a new object is involved, the prior cases decided under the doctrine of
attractive nuisance afford no more than a very general and sometimes vague
guideline at best.
THE CHANGE IN THE ATTRAcrIvE NUISANCE DOCTRINE IN ILLINOIS

From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the attractive nuisance
doctrine was a clumsy and difficult tool to use in many situations. When it
25 239 Ill. App. 583 (1916).
26 McDermott v. Burke, 256 Ill. 401, 100 N.E. 168 (1912).
27 Ibid.
28 Moore v. North Chicago Refiners and Smelters, 346 Ill. App. 530, 105 N.E.2d 553
(2d Dist. 1952); Ramsey v. Tuthill, 295 I11. 395, 129 N.E. 127 (1920).
29 McDermott v. Burke, supra note 26.
80 Szymczak v. Schillinger Bros. Co., 197 Ill. App. 585 (1st Dist. 1916).
81 Rodgers v. Beach, 288 11. App. 462, 6 N.E.2d 244 (3d Dist. 1937).
32 Schlatter v. Peoria, 309 I1. App. 636, 33 N.E.2d 730 (2d Dist. 1941).
33 Wood v. Consumers Co., 334 Ill. App. 530, 79 N.E.2d 826 (2d Dist. 1948).
84 Shapiro v. Chicago, 308 IIl. App. 613, 32 N.E.2d 338 (lst Dist. 1941).
35 Featherstone v. Freeding, 349 Ill. App. 359, 110 N.E.2d 535 (lst Dist. 1953).
36 Pekin v. McMahon, 154 Ill. 141, 39 N.E. 484 (1895).
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was applied strictly, no recovery was allowed for injuries sustained when
the object causing the injuries did not attract the child onto the property.
This result was obtained even though the child was attracted onto the
property by another object of a type not generally classified as an "attractive nuisance." Another problem is that what is attractive to one child may
not be attractive to another, so that no arbitrary classification of objects as
"attractive" or "non-attractive" is possible.
In 1955 the case of Kahn v. James Burton Company3 7 was decided, and
substantially altered the attractive nuisance doctrine in Illinois. In the
Kahn case, a house was being built by a contractor on land belonging to
the defendant owners. When the contractor was ready to begin the carpentry work, a lumber company delivered the lumber to the site. No one else
was present when this delivery was made. The lumber was stacked in accordance with the custom of the trade, with the pieces to be used first being
placed on top. This resulted in the boards on top being larger than those
on the bottom, and the stack was not braced in any way. On prior occasions
several children had played on a mound of dirt on the lot and the contractor had knowledge of this fact. The plaintiff, an eleven-year-old boy, had
not previously visited the site, however, and his first visit took place after
the delivery of the lumber. He climbed up on the stack of boards and was
injured when the stack collapsed and fell on him. The Appellate Court
held for the defendants (contractor, lumber company), using the attractive
nuisance theory.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the Appellate Court,
holding that the duty of care to be exercised to make the premises safe for
children is that established by the rules of ordinary negligence, with the
attractability of the object merely being a factor in determining the foreseeability of harm. The rule was stated by the court as follows:

It is generally true . . . that an owner or one in possession and
control of premises is under no duty to keep them in any particular state or condition to promote the safety of trespassers who
come upon them without any invitation, either express or implied.
It is also established that infants, as a general rule, have no greater
rights to go upon the land of others than adults, and that their
minority, of itself, imposes no duty upon the occupier of land to
expect them or prepare for their safety. It is recognized, however,
that an exception exists where the owner or person in possession
knows, or should know, that young children habitually frequent
the vicinity of a defective structure or dangerous agency existing on
the land, which is likely to cause injury to them because they, by
reason of their immaturity, are incapable of appreciating the risk
involved, and where the expense or inconvenience of remedying
the condition is slight compared to the risk to the children. In
such cases there is a duty upon the owner or other person in posses37

1955).

1 Ill. App. 2d 370, 117 N.E.2d 670, rev'd, 5 Il. 2d 614, 126 N.E.2d 836 (lst Dist,
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sion and control of the premises to exercise due care to remedy the
condition or otherwise protect the children from injury resulting
from it. The element of attraction is significant only insofar as it
indicates that the trespass should be anticipated, the true basis of
liability being the foreseeability of harm to the child.38 (Emphasis
added.)
THE LANDOWNER'S DUTY TOWARD MINORS SINCE THE KAHN DECISION IN

1955

Stated in other words, the rule of the Kahn case is that the landowner's
duty toward minors is to exercise due care to keep the premises safe based
on the foreseeability of harm which might occur if such care were not exercised. Although the Kahn case dealt with a trespass situation, the rule stated
by the court was not limited to trespass alone. It should be noted that the
trial court directed a verdict in favor of the landowner in the Kahn case
on the grounds that he had no knowledge of the dangerous objects and that
control of the premises was in the defendant contractor at the time of plaintiff's injury. The language used by the Supreme Court leaves no doubt,
however, that the rule also extends to landowners who are in control of
their premises. This has been borne out in the application of the Kahn
rule to landowners in several Appellate Court decisions, representative of
which are: Skaggs v. Junis,39 Zorn v. Bellrose,40 Halloran v. Belt Ry. Com-

pany,41 Runions v. Liberty National Bank,4 2 Kuhn v. Goedde,43 and Smith
44
v. Springman Lumber Company.
In the Skaggs case, the plaintiff, a sixteen-year-old boy, was injured
when he hit a submerged stump while diving into an artificial pond on
the defendant's property. The defendant had seen the plaintiff swim in
the pond several times; and although the plaintiff did not have express
permission to swim there, neither did the defendant ever tell the plaintiff
not to swim in the pond. The defendant relied upon the attractive nuisance
doctrine that ponds without floating objects on them cannot be an attractive nuisance. 45 Although the facts of the case provide some basis for treating the plaintiff as an invitee, the Kahn foreseeability rule was expressly
followed in reversing a lower court judgment in favor of the defendant.
In the Zorn case, where a six-year-old boy crawled through three fences
and some chains at the head of some steps on the defendant's property before falling into the river and drowning, the court applied the Kahn rule,
but found the defendants not liable since they had exercised more care than
the ordinary prudent person.
38 Id. at 625, 126 N.E.2d at 841-42.

39
40
41
42

27
22
25
15

Ill. App. 2d 251, 169 N.E.2d 684 (2d Dist. 1960).
11. App. 2d 331, 160 N.E.2d 685 (2d Dist. 1959).

Il1. App. 2d 114, 166 N.E.2d 98 (1st Dist. 1960).
Ill. App. 2d 538, 147 N.E.2d 380 (1st Dist. 1957).

43 26 Ill. App. 2d 123, 167 N.E.2d 805 (4th Dist. 1960).

44 41 Ill. App. 2d 403, 191 N.E.2d 256 (4th Dist. 1963).
45 Wood v. Consumers Co., 334 Il1. App. 530, 79 N.E.2d 826 (2d Dist. 1948).
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The Halloran case has a fact situation similar to that of the Seymour
case, inasmuch as the defendant maintained unfenced sand piles near a
railroad track. Children had to cross the tracks to get to the sand and plaintiff was injured by a train. The court reversed a summary judgment for the
defendant, followed the foreseeability rule of the Kahn case, and held that
even though the sand, per se, was not dangerous, the defendant should have
anticipated dangers to children in the vicinity of the sand. The court said:
We believe the rule (of Kahn) may be reasonably applied so as to
render Consumers liable for injuries to children, where it is responsible for the creation of the attraction, notwithstanding Consumers does not own or control the premises on which plaintif
was injured. It had notice, direct or otherwise, that children habitually came upon its premises to play upon the sand piles. A duty
arose to exercise due care for their safety, if they were exposed to
danger in the immediate approach to its premises. 46 (Emphasis
added.)
This result is precisely the opposite of that reached by the court in
the Seymour case in which the attractive nuisance doctrine was applied.
In the Runions case, the plaintiff, six years old, was injured in a fall
off a garage roof adjacent to a playground maintained by the defendant.
A ladder-like arrangement of benches, gates, and walls enabled the plaintiff to reach the roof. In denying the defendant's motion to strike, the court
held:
. . . defendant knew or should have known that children were
liable to play and climb the ladder-like arrangement . . . to reach
the roofs, and that the roofs, by reason of the lack of protection on
one side, created an unreasonable danger to them. It (the complaint) states
a factual situation stronger than that set forth in the
47
Kahn case.
In the Kuhn case, a tractor was left unattended on the landowner's lot
by an independent contractor. A child playing on the tractor was injured.
Since the landowner had no knowledge of the presence of the tractor, the
court decided in his favor, basing its decision on the fact that under the
rules or ordinary negligence, there must be either actual or constructive
knowledge of the presence of the object causing the injury on the part of
the party charged before he can be liable. Thus, the foreseeability rule
of Kahn was applied.
The defendant landowner in Smith stored an oil tank in the yard
adjacent to his apartment building. The tank was not defective in any way,
and children climbed on it. The defendant had been requested by mothers
of the children to remove the tank prior to the time that the minor plaintiff
46

Halloran v. Belt Ry. Co., 25 Ill. App. 2d 114, 119, 166 N.E.2d 98, 100-01 (lst Dist.

1960).
47 Runions v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 15 Il1. App. 2d 538, 542, 147 N.E.2d 380, 382 (lst
Dist. 1957).
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fell off the tank and was injured. It is difficult to see how the oil tank could
have been considered an attractive nuisance under prior Illinois decisions, 48
but plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant under the "foreseeability of harm" rule of the Kahn case.
Four other cases decided since the Kahn case worthy of mention are
Wilinski v. Belmont Builders,49 Kleren v. Bowman, 50 Melford v. Guas and
Brown Construction Company,51 and Stewart v. DuPlessis.5 2 Those cases
are concerned with situations in which the property on which the injury
to a minor occurred was in the possession and control of contractors at
the time of the accident, with the result that the landowner was held not
liable, while the contractors were found liable. In all of these cases the
foreseeability rule of Kahn was followed.
In Krantz v. Nichols,5 3 decided in the 4th District shortly after the
Kahn decision, the foreseeability rule in Kahn was not applied in the case
of a minor licensee. The plaintiff in the Krantz case was five years old and
lived on a neighboring farm to that owned by the defendant. The plaintiff
was visiting the defendant's farm, and was injured riding on a platform
behind the seat of the defendant's tractor. The court held that under the
facts, the plaintiff was not an invitee but was a social guest and stated:
*.. the law is well settled that a social guest is treated as a licensee
and not an invitee and therefore must prove wilful and wanton
misconduct in order to recover against the possessor of the land...
that in the absence of a54showing of attractive nuisance, the rule is
applicable to children.
The decision in the Krantz case did not mention the Kahn foreseeability of harm rule, which, if it had been applied by the court, probably
would have resulted in judgment for the plaintiff instead of for the
defendant.
Another significant case decided after the Supreme Court established
the foreseeability rule in Kahn is Stankowitz v. Goldblatt Bros.5 5 The
plaintiff was a 2 -year-old girl who accompanied her mother shopping in
the defendant's store. As a consequence, the girl was in the position of an
invitee at the time. 56 The defendant provided a water cooler for the use
of customers and knew that children used the cooler. No step was provided, however, to allow children to reach the water. The plaintiff stepped
48 McDermott v. Burke, 256 Ill. 401, 100 N.E. 168 (1912); Rodgers v. Beach, 288
Ill. App. 462, 6 N.E.2d 244 (3d Dist. 1937).
49 14 IlL. App. 2d 100, 143 N.E.2d 69 (Ist Dist. 1957).
50 15 Il. App. 2d 148, 145 N.E.2d 810 (2d Dist. 1957).
51 17 Il1. App. 2d 497, 151 N.E.2d 128 (1st Dist. 1958).
52 42 Ill. App. 2d 192, 191 N.E.2d 622 (1st Dist. 1963).
53 11 Ill.App. 2d 37, 135 N.E.2d 816 (4th Dist. 1956).
54 Id. at 41-2, 135 N.E.2d at 818.
55 43 Ill.
App. 2d 173, 193 N.E.2d 97 (1st Dist. 1963).
56 Wheaton v. Goldblatt Bros., 295 Ill. App. 618, 15 N.E.2d 64 (1st Dist. 1938).
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on the plug of the cooler, which was in the wall a few inches above the
floor. When plaintiff did this, she was burned by bare wires extending from
the plug. In allowing recovery by the plaintiff, the court followed the
foreseeability rule of the Kahn and Halloran cases, stating:
Defendant had notice that children frequently drank from the
fountain, which was not equipped with a step or stool. Fair-minded
men might believe that defendant, in the exercise of ordinary
care, should have reasonably anticipated that small children, in
attempting to drink from the fountain would climb upon the
machine and its electrical connections and that injuries such as
that of plaintiff might "naturally flow as a reasonably probable
of the failure of children to realize
and foreseeable consequence"
57
the danger involved.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps the best summary of the present duties of owners and occupiers of land in Illinois is given in the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,
Civil, section 120.04, which states:
120.04 Attractive Nuisance-Injury to Trespassing Children
Plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following
propositions:
First: That a condition existed on the (defendant's) premises
which the defendant knew, or, in the exercise of ordinary care
should have known, involved a reasonably foreseeable risk of
harm to children.
Second: That the defendant foresaw, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have foreseen, that children would be likely
to trespass on (his) (the) premises.
Third: That the plaintiff was in the exercise of that degree
of care which a reasonably careful (minor) (child) of the age,
mental capacity and experience of the plaintiff would use under
circumstances such as those shown by the evidence.
Fourth: That the expense or inconvenience to the defendant
in remedying the condition would be slight in comparison to the
risk of harm to children.
Fifth: That the condition was a proximate cause of the injury or damage to the plaintiff.
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that
each of these propositions has been proved, then your verdict
should be for the plaintiff. If, on the other hand, you find from
your consideration of all the evidence that any of these propositions was not proved, then your verdict should be for the defendant. 58
57 Stankowitz v. Goldblatt Bros., 43 Ill. App. 2d 173, 178, 193 N.E.2d 97, 100 (1st
Dist. 1963).
58 Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions--Civil, Illinois Supreme Court Committee on
Jury Instructions, Section 120.04, p. 335 (1961).
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The impact of the Kahn case on the duty of landowners toward
minors in Illinois is twofold. First, it has had the effect of establishing a
single rule of law to be applied to injuries received by a minor while on
the landowner's property in any capacity, whether it be as a licensee,
trespasser, or invitee. As a consequence, it no longer is necessary to draw
the sometimes difficult distinction as to what status the minor occupies at
the moment of injury. The rule is one of foreseeability of harm in all cases.
The second effect of the Kahn decision has been a substantial modification of the attractive nuisance doctrine in Illinois. The attractiveness of
objects now is significant only insofar as it indicates to the landowner
that children are likely to trespass. It is not necessary, however, under
the Kahn rule, that the children be attracted by the object which harms
them. To find a landowner liable it is sufficient that he has knowledge
of such trespasses or that it is foreseeable that such trespasses might take
place. The net result is a broadening of the landowner's duty toward
trespassing children to the extent that his duty toward a trespassing child
is almost as great as it is to an invitee.
LA VALLE D. PTAK

